Trump's arrogant fool may follow a despised predecessor's path — and suffer the same fate

Watching the loathsome Pete Hegseth testify over the last two days in front of both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees gave me a slight sense of déjà vu.

I struggled with why, because Hegseth just comes off like such a jerk. And that’s when it hit me. Former President George H.W. Bush once famously referred to former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as a “jerk.”

Granted, comparisons have been made between Rumsfeld’s arrogance, another word Bush used to describe his son’s Pentagon chief, and Hegseth. But what hasn’t been fully considered is how both approached congressional hearings during failing wars.

I vividly recall Rumsfeld treating his testimony with a prickly, know-it-all crassness. That’s the same way Hegseth came off, over-the-top defensive, slight pun intended.

At the time, Republicans in control of Congress tolerated Rumsfeld’s dismissive attitude. Then came the 2006 midterms, which swung to the Democrats. It’s no coincidence that Rumsfeld resigned the morning after.

His boss, George W. Bush, understood that voters had delivered a verdict on a war they were tired of being spun about, and the system had shifted against him and his abrasive defense secretary.

After watching Hegseth this week, it’s fair to ask: if Democrats regain control of Congress, will he be destined for the same fate?

The Rumsfeld–Hegseth comparison has been duly noted. Both men arrived at the Pentagon radiating egotism. Both treated congressional oversight as an unnecessary inconvenience, even though it’s the law. Both have overseen wars facing strong public backlash, and both showed open disdain for lawmakers tasked with questioning them - that’s their job.

But the comparison ultimately lets Hegseth off too easily. Whether you liked Rumsfeld or disliked him, he built a formidable career as a Navy pilot, a four-term congressman, and White House chief of staff. He became the youngest Secretary of Defense at 43 under Gerald Ford, and later the oldest under Bush.

Hegseth’s credentials can be summed up this way: don’t ask, because he’ll lie; don’t tell, because there’s nothing to tell.

Rumsfeld’s contempt for Congress was more cerebral than Hegseth’s. After watching him closely for five years, he thought he was smarter than everyone in the room and made a show of it. His evasions relied on cutesy wordplay like “known unknowns,” “stuff happens.” It was maddeningly condescending, but he operated within a system he knew well.

Hegseth is about as far from cerebral as you can get. He has little institutional experience, and his fallback replaces wordplay with blunt aggression. When Rep. John Garamendi called the war a “geopolitical calamity,” Hegseth shot back: “Who are you cheering for here?”

When pressed on the nearly $25 billion already spent, a figure many say is far too low, he brushed it off. When lawmakers expressed skepticism, he labeled them “the biggest adversary” facing the United States.

To Rumsfeld, the game with Congress was a chess match of wits, where Rumsfeld thought he could fight with one arm behind his back. Hegseth thinks he needs to put both fisted arms out to underscore his warrior ethos.

Rumsfeld treated Congress as an obstacle. Hegseth treats it as an enemy. Both approaches are ultimately self-defeating.

The financial parallels are hard to ignore. In 2003, Rumsfeld told Congress the Iraq invasion would cost under $50 billion. It ultimately exceeded $2 trillion.

Now, two months into the Iran war, there is still confusion about the total cost. The Pentagon’s $25 billion figure seems far short of earlier estimates, suggesting a burn rate near $1 billion a day. If that holds, the cost after 40 days would already be around $40 billion.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon is already tens of billions in, with a massive supplemental request looming. Congress hasn’t formally authorized the war and hasn’t been given a clear price tag.

Rumsfeld at least understood Congress would eventually demand answers. His strategy was to delay, push forward until backing out became politically impossible.

Hegseth’s posture is more extreme. He behaves as if Congress isn’t entitled to answers at all. Oversight, in his view, is disloyal.

That stance aligns with a broader theory of executive power: that Trump, and by extension his defense secretary, can wage war with minimal interference.

The War Powers Resolution clock has already run out on the Iran conflict, launched without congressional authorization. Legal concerns are mounting, and Democrats, and some Republicans, in Congress are taking notice.

The political environment is shifting. The war is unpopular. Costs are rising. Voters are focused on domestic concerns. The conditions that led to the 2006 backlash are reappearing, only faster.

Midterms are months away. If control of Congress flips, oversight will intensify.

Rumsfeld understood what a hostile Congress meant, a nightmare really, with loads of subpoenas, hearings, and more exposure to his trickery. He chose to leave rather than endure it.

For Hegseth, if this war drags on without clear victories and public support continues to erode, a Democratic House will investigate, and then some. And when it does, it won’t tolerate his warrior ethos, obfuscation, or that grating arrogance.

So, will Hegseth end up following Rumsfeld out the door?