This section examines the gap in current blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) research, noting that most models assume myopic miners and ignore time-sensitive transactions. By introducing the concept of transaction expiry and connecting it to auction theory, packet scheduling, and real-world analogies like ride-sharing, the work expands on existing algorithms (e.g., RMIX, MG) to show how incorporating urgency and discount factors could lead to more efficient and fair blockchain fee systems.This section examines the gap in current blockchain Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) research, noting that most models assume myopic miners and ignore time-sensitive transactions. By introducing the concept of transaction expiry and connecting it to auction theory, packet scheduling, and real-world analogies like ride-sharing, the work expands on existing algorithms (e.g., RMIX, MG) to show how incorporating urgency and discount factors could lead to more efficient and fair blockchain fee systems.

The Algorithmic Evolution of Blockchain Fee Design

2025/10/14 03:54

Abstract and 1. Introduction

1.1 Our Approach

1.2 Our Results & Roadmap

1.3 Related Work

  1. Model and Warmup and 2.1 Blockchain Model

    2.2 The Miner

    2.3 Game Model

    2.4 Warm Up: The Greedy Allocation Function

  2. The Deterministic Case and 3.1 Deterministic Upper Bound

    3.2 The Immediacy-Biased Class Of Allocation Function

  3. The Randomized Case

  4. Discussion and References

  • A. Missing Proofs for Sections 2, 3
  • B. Missing Proofs for Section 4
  • C. Glossary

1.2 Our Results & Roadmap

1.3 Related Work

The application of auction theory to the design of TFMs was explored by a line of works [LSZ22; Yao18; BEOS19; Rou21; CS23], that focused primarily on the axiomatic aspects of the blockchain setting when considering myopic miners.

\ Considerations such as transactions with a finite time to live and non-myopic miners are outside the scope of all the above literature and is a recognized important gap in our understanding of TFMs. Although we focus on the TFM of Blockchain systems, the addition of a predefined expiry date for transactions means that the setting is related to other resource allocation under time-constraints problems. Some examples are deadline-aware job scheduling [SC16] and ride-sharing [DSSX21]. The closest model to ours is perhaps that of Fiat et al. [FGKK16], who analyze a similar framework that considers single-minded users who assign both a fee and some urgency to their requests.

\ \

\ \ The literature of packet scheduling also considered randomized algorithms and upper bounds. [CCFJST06] suggested a randomized algorithm that works, similarly to MG, by considering the heaviest packet vs. the best early-deadline packet, but uses a randomized coefficient to determine which of them to choose. We show that [CCFJST06] can be generalized to depend on the discount factor. Our generalization is the same as RMIX when λ = 1, and the same as the greedy algorithm when λ = 0, where it achieves the optimal competitive ratio of 1. [BCJ11] extended RMIX analysis from the oblivious to the adaptive adversary, and also provided an upper bound for any randomized algorithm against the adaptive adversary. We show how to extend their construction to depend on the discount factor. An overview of the packet scheduling literature, including open problems in the field, can be found in [Ves21]. While we do not attempt to give a conclusive overview, we note that there is an alternative literature to that of packet scheduling with deadlines, that considers analysis of whether or not to accept packets to a FIFO queue, and there, a latency sensitive model was previously considered [FMN08].

\

:::info Authors:

(1) Yotam Gafni, Weizmann Institute (yotam.gafni@gmail.com);

(2) Aviv Yaish, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem (aviv.yaish@mail.huji.ac.il).

:::


:::info This paper is available on arxiv under CC BY 4.0 DEED license.

:::

\

Disclaimer: The articles reposted on this site are sourced from public platforms and are provided for informational purposes only. They do not necessarily reflect the views of MEXC. All rights remain with the original authors. If you believe any content infringes on third-party rights, please contact service@support.mexc.com for removal. MEXC makes no guarantees regarding the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the content and is not responsible for any actions taken based on the information provided. The content does not constitute financial, legal, or other professional advice, nor should it be considered a recommendation or endorsement by MEXC.
Share Insights

You May Also Like

Ethereum Foundation Moves Entire $650M+ Treasury to Safe Multisig

Ethereum Foundation Moves Entire $650M+ Treasury to Safe Multisig

The post Ethereum Foundation Moves Entire $650M+ Treasury to Safe Multisig appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. EF completes full treasury migration to Safe smart accounts, joining Vitalik Buterin as key Safe user + Safe smart accounts cross 750M transactions milestone.   The Ethereum Foundation has completed the migration of its full treasury, over 160,000 ETH worth approximately $650 million to Safe{Wallet}, following months of successful DeFi testing. Safe{Wallet}, operated by Safe Labs (a fully owned subsidiary of the Safe Foundation), is the crypto industry’s trusted smart account standard for multisig wallets, securing billions of dollars in assets for institutions, DAOs, and projects. The move follows the Foundation’s June 2025 treasury policy announcement, which committed to actively participating in Ethereum’s DeFi ecosystem. Since February, the EF had been testing Safe with a separate DeFi-focused account, dogfooding protocols including Aave, Cowswap, and Morpho as part of their strategy to support applications built on Ethereum. After testing a 3-of-5 multisig configuration on January 20th, the Foundation has now consolidated its remaining ETH holdings into Safe, completing the transition from their previous custom-built multisig solution. This implementation enables the Ethereum Foundation to actively participate in DeFi via Safe while maintaining battle-tested security standards, marking another step toward Safe’s vision of moving the world’s GDP onchain through battle-tested self-custody infrastructure. “Safe has proven safe and has a great user experience, and we will transfer more of our funds here over time,” the Ethereum Foundation announced, indicating this is the beginning of a deeper commitment to the Safe smart account standard. Safe’s Momentum The timing is notable: Safe has just crossed 750 million transactions (751,062,286 as of today) with over 57.5 million Safes created across multiple chains. The protocol has emerged as crypto’s de facto standard for multisig wallets, securing billions in institutional and DAO treasuries. Safe also counts Ethereum co-founder Vitalik Buterin among its prominent users, who revealed in May 2024 that…
Share
2025/10/23 04:15
Share
Citadel’s Stake in Solana Treasury Firm DeFi Dev Corp Highlights Potential Crypto Exposure

Citadel’s Stake in Solana Treasury Firm DeFi Dev Corp Highlights Potential Crypto Exposure

The post Citadel’s Stake in Solana Treasury Firm DeFi Dev Corp Highlights Potential Crypto Exposure appeared on BitcoinEthereumNews.com. COINOTAG recommends • Exchange signup 💹 Trade with pro tools Fast execution, robust charts, clean risk controls. 👉 Open account → COINOTAG recommends • Exchange signup 🚀 Smooth orders, clear control Advanced order types and market depth in one view. 👉 Create account → COINOTAG recommends • Exchange signup 📈 Clarity in volatile markets Plan entries & exits, manage positions with discipline. 👉 Sign up → COINOTAG recommends • Exchange signup ⚡ Speed, depth, reliability Execute confidently when timing matters. 👉 Open account → COINOTAG recommends • Exchange signup 🧭 A focused workflow for traders Alerts, watchlists, and a repeatable process. 👉 Get started → COINOTAG recommends • Exchange signup ✅ Data‑driven decisions Focus on process—not noise. 👉 Sign up → Citadel’s investment in DeFi Dev Corp represents a 4.5% stake held by the firm, with CEO Ken Griffin owning another 4.5%, totaling significant exposure to Solana treasury operations through this leading DAT company. Citadel and subsidiaries control over 9% of DeFi Dev Corp shares, highlighting hedge fund interest in Solana-based treasuries. DeFi Dev Corp has increased its SOL per share by 375% since initial acquisitions. Solana treasuries now hold 20.31 million SOL, with 9 million staked for an average 7.7% yield. Discover Citadel’s 4.5% stake in DeFi Dev Corp and its impact on Solana treasuries. Explore SOL holdings growth and market insights for informed crypto investment decisions today. What is Citadel’s Stake in DeFi Dev Corp? Citadel’s investment in DeFi Dev Corp includes a 4.5% ownership through the firm itself, complemented by an additional 4.5% held directly by CEO Ken Griffin. This positions Citadel among the top shareholders in the Solana-focused treasury company. Various Citadel subsidiaries, such as Citadel Advisors LLC and Citadel Securities LLC, contribute further stakes totaling around 6%, as detailed in a recent ownership report. COINOTAG…
Share
2025/10/23 03:57
Share